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The criminal prosecution of Robert Pickton
involved an eleven-month jury trial, two appeals to
the British Columbia Court of Appeal, an appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada, and seventy-six reported judicial rulings. This article, through a combination of discursive and doctrinal analyses of
these seventy-six decisions, examines what was
(not) achieved by the Pickton trial. It discusses
three areas: the judicial representation of the
women Pickton was prosecuted for murdering; the
implications of the jury’s verdict in the Pickton
proceedings; and the impact of the Pickton trial on
the families of the women he murdered. The article
starts from the premise that it is correct to characterize these murders as a product of collective violence. Colonialism, political and legal infrastructure, and public discourse—and hegemonies based
on race, class, and gender that these processes, institutions, and practices hold in place—produced a
particular class of vulnerable women, the police
who failed them, and Robert Pickton. The article
concludes by suggesting that the outcomes of the
Pickton prosecution both highlight the limitations
of the criminal justice system and offer an analytical framework for examining other institutional responses (such as the Missing Women’s Inquiry) to
the kind of collective violence that gave rise to the
Pickton circumstance.

*

Les poursuites pénales contre Robert Pickton
ont compris un procès devant un jury de onze mois,
deux appels à la Cour d’appel de la ColombieBritannique, un appel à la Cour suprême du Canada et soixante-seize jugements. Cet article
s’interroge, par une combinaison d’analyses discursive et doctrinale de ces soixante-seize décisions,
sur ce que le procès Pickton a (et n’a pas) accompli,
abordant trois aspects de ce procès : la représentation judiciaire des femmes que Pickton a tué; les
implications du verdict du jury; et l’impact du procès sur les familles des femmes qu’il a tué. L’article
se fonde sur la notion que l’on peut caractériser ces
meurtres comme étant des produits de la violence
collective. Le colonialisme, l’infrastructure politique et juridique, et le discours public, de plus que
les hégémonies basées sur la race, la classe, et le
genre, que ces processus, ces institutions et ces
pratiques maintiennent, ont produit à la fois une
classe particulière de femmes vulnérables, la police
qui leur a manqué et Robert Pickton lui-même. En
conclusion, l’article conclut en suggère que les résultats du procès Pickton mettent en évidence les
limites du système de justice pénale et offrent un
cadre analytique pour l’examen d'autres réponses
institutionnelles (telles que l’Enquête sur les
femmes disparues) au genre de violence collective
qui a provoqué la circonstance Pickton.
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I. The Pickton Circumstance
Women are disappearing. Sixty-nine of them disappeared from the
Downtown Eastside of Vancouver between 1997 and 2002.1 Northern
communities in British Columbia believe that more than forty women
have gone missing from the Highway of Tears in the past thirty years.2
The endangered do not come from every walk of life. Most of these women
are Aboriginal. Many of them are poor.3
To be more precise then, poor women and Aboriginal women are disappearing.4 Aboriginal women in particular are the targets of an undeniable epidemic of violence in Canada.5 They are five to seven times more
likely to be killed as a result of violence than are non-Aboriginal women.6
Robert Pickton is thought to have murdered almost fifty of the women
reported as missing from the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver between
1997 and 2002. Following years of widespread indifference toward the
shocking number of women that continued to disappear from this neighbourhood in Vancouver, an investigation finally resulted in Pickton’s arrest in 2002. Pickton confessed to killing forty-nine women with an aspiration to make it an “even fifty”.7 The DNA of thirty-three missing women

1

British Columbia, Missing Women Commission of Inquiry, Forsaken: The Report of the
Missing Women Commission of Inquiry (Vancouver: Missing Women Commission of Inquiry, 2012) vol 1 at 33, online: Missing Women Commission of Inquiry <www.
missingwomeninquiry.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Forsaken-Vol-1-web-RGB.pdf>
[Missing Women’s Inquiry Vol I].

2

Ibid at 29.

3

Ibid at 23–24.

4

Police report that many of the women who have gone missing from the Highway of
Tears area were working in the sex trade at the time of their disappearance. Many of
them were Aboriginal. See Patrick Brethour, “Treat ‘Highway of Tears’ Victims as
Woman First, Police Told”, The Globe and Mail (17 October 2010), online: <www.
theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/treat-highway-of-tears-victims-as-womenfirst-police-told/article1320096/>.

5

For a discussion of this epidemic and the relationship between violence against women
and Aboriginal and treaty rights under Constitution Act, 1982, s 35, being schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 see John Burrows, “Aboriginal and Treaty Rights
and Violence Against Women” (2013) 50:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 699.

6

Amnesty International, No More Stolen Sisters: The Need for a Comprehensive Response to Discrimination and Violence against Indigenous Women in Canada (London:
Amnesty International Publications, 2009) at 1, online: Amnesty International <www.
amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/amr200122009enstolensistersupdate.pdf>.

7

R v Pickton, 2007 BCSC 29, [2007] BCJ No 3075 (citing a transcript of the undercover
cellmate interview with Pickton: “I was gonna do one more, make it an even fifty” at
para 20).
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was found on his farm.8 He was charged with murdering twenty-six women, and charges against him were recommended with respect to several
other missing women.9 Following Pickton’s conviction for murder in only
six of these cases,10 the government of British Columbia conducted a public inquiry into police failures to investigate the disappearances in a timely manner.11
The Missing Women Commission of Inquiry concluded that “in the
cold hard light of 2012, using an objective test and avoiding the unerring
eye of hindsight ... the missing and murdered women investigations were
a blatant failure.”12 According to the BC Civil Liberties Association, Pivot
Legal Society and West Coast LEAF, the Missing Women Commission of
Inquiry was also “an absolute failure”.13 The police investigation into
missing and murdered women in the Downtown Eastside and the Missing
Women’s Inquiry into that police investigation constitute two institutional
responses to these disappearances. Their failings and achievements have

8

Missing Women’s Inquiry Vol I, supra note 1 at 33. See also Lori Culbert, “2 More Women Identified From DNA at Pickton Farm”, Vancouver Sun (30 October 2009), online:
<www.canada.com/story.html?id=073750d6-ba23-4211-ac22-3f4e752186ea>; Lori Culbert, “Police to Recommend Pickton Be Charged for Deaths of Six More Women”, Vancouver Sun (29 October 2009), online: <www.vancouversun.com/Police+recommend+
Pickton+charged+deaths+more+women/2159939/story.html>.

9

In October 2009, RCMP recommended Pickton be charged with the murders of Sharon
Abraham, Stephanie Lane, Yvonne Boen, Jackie Murdock, Dawn Crey and Nancy
Clark (Stevie Cameron, On the Farm: Robert William Pickton and the Tragic Story of
Vancouver’s Missing Women (Toronto: Alfred A Knopf, 2010) at 701–702 [Cameron, On
the Farm]).

10

R v Pickton, 2006 BCSC 1212, [2006] BCJ No 3671. One of the counts was stayed by
the trial judge and twenty by the Attorney General of British Columbia, after Pickton’s conviction on six counts of second-degree murder. See Rod Mickleburgh, “Pickton
Legal Saga Ends as Remaining Charges Stayed” The Globe and Mail (4 August 2010),
online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/pickton-legal-saga-ends-asremaining-charges-stayed/article1377540/>.

11

British Columbia, Missing Women Commission of Inquiry, “Terms of Reference” (Vancouver: Missing Women Commission of Inquiry, 2013), online: Missing Women Commission of Inquiry <www.missingwomeninquiry.ca/terms-of-reference/>.

12

British Columbia, Missing Women Commission of Inquiry, Forsaken: The Report of the
Missing Women Commission of Inquiry (Vancouver: Missing Women Commission of Inquiry, 2012) vol 2A at 1, online: Government of British Columbia <www.ag.gov.bc.ca/
public_inquiries/docs/Forsaken-Vol_2A.pdf> [Missing Women’s Inquiry Vol II].

13

Darcie Bennett et al, Blueprint for an Inquiry: Learning from the Failures of the Missing Women Commission of Inquiry (Vancouver: BC Civil Liberties Association, West
Coast Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund, Pivot Legal Society, 2012) at 5,
online: BC Civil Liberties Association <www.bccla.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/
20121119-Report-Missing-Women-Inquiry.pdf>.
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received public, media, and government attention.14 To date, what has not
received as much attention is the criminal justice system’s response to the
murder of these women.15
The criminal prosecution of Robert Pickton involved an eleven-month
jury trial, two appeals to the British Columbia Court of Appeal, an appeal
to the Supreme Court of Canada, $12 million in defence counsel legal expenses, a $2 million upgrade to the New Westminster courthouse, $9 million in Crown counsel expenses, $12 million in judicial support, trial support, security, and management costs, and seventy-six reported judicial
rulings.16 This article, through a combination of discursive and doctrinal
analysis of these seventy-six decisions, examines what was (not) achieved
by the Pickton trial. It discusses three areas: the judicial representation of
the women Pickton was prosecuted for murdering; the implications of the
jury’s verdict in the Pickton proceedings; and the impact of the Pickton
trial on the families of the women he murdered.17
The article starts from the premise that it is correct to characterize
these murders as a product of collective violence. The World Health Organization defines collective violence as “the instrumental use of violence
by people who identify themselves as members of a group – whether this
group is transitory or has a more permanent identity – against another
group or set of individuals, in order to achieve political, economic or social

14

See ibid; Missing Women’s Inquiry Vol I, supra note 1. “Pickton Inquiry Slams ‘Blatant
Failures’ by Police”, CBC News (17 December 2012), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
british-columbia/story/2012/12/17/bc-pickton-missing-women-report.html>; “Families of
Four Missing Women File Lawsuit Against Pickton, Police, Government”, MacLean’s (9
May 2013), online: <www2.macleans.ca/2013/05/09/families-of-four-missing-women-filelawsuit-against-pickton-police-government-2/>; Brian Hutchinson, “Missing Women Inquiry Beset by ‘Sexism’: Ex-Staff”, National Post (3 April 2012), online:
<news.nationalpost.com/2012/04/03/missing-women-inquiry-staff-claim-abuse-highlysexualized-workplace/>; Brian Hutchinson, “Pickton Inquiry Gives Cold Shoulder to
Key Witness”, National Post (12 February 2013), online: <www.fullcomment.
nationalpost.com/2012/02/13/brian-hutchinson-pickton-inquiry-gives-cold-shoulder-tokey-witness/>; Harsha Walia, “Why the B.C. Missing Women’s Commission of Inquiry
Fails” Rabble (11 October 2011), online: <rabble.ca/news/2011/10/why-missing-womenscommission-inquiry-fails>.

15

Quicklaw and Westlaw searches conducted on July 22, 2013 suggest that, to date, legal
scholars have not produced any scholarship on the Pickton trial and appeals.

16

“Pickton Prosecution Cost More Than $100 Million”, CBC News (16 November 2010)
(reporting on figures released by British Columbia’s Ministry of the Attorney General in
November, 2010.), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/story/2010/11/16/
bc-robert-pickton-trial-costs.html>.

17

In this article, “Pickton trial” or “Pickton proceedings” refers to the proceedings generally rather than to any specific ruling out of the seventy-six reported judicial rulings.
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objectives.”18 Sereena Abotsway, Mona Wilson, Andrea Joesbury, Brenda
Wolfe, Georgina Papin, Marnie Frey and countless others from the Downtown Eastside were rendered subhuman and disposed of well before they
encountered Robert Pickton. The horror of what Robert Pickton did to
these women, and of a police force that ignored what was happening for
years,19 pales in comparison to the collective violence that produced these
subjects and their actions. Colonialism, sexism, the political and legal infrastructure, public, media and legal discourse—and the race-, class-, and
gender-based hegemonies that these processes, institutions, policies, and
practices hold in place—produced a class of vulnerable women, the police
who failed them, and Robert Pickton.
To put it otherwise, it is unsurprising that these women in particular,
from this community in particular, were murdered. “Do you think Willie
Pickton just entered this picture out of the blue? I mean, we created a pool
that nobody cared about, and he went to it.”20 It is unsurprising that the
police investigation into the murdered and missing women was a “blatant
failure”.21 Entrenched structural inequalities in Canadian society produced a category of illegible subjects, denied access to the social contract
upon which the state’s monopoly on power and the paramilitary organizations charged with enforcing it are purportedly justified. In a sense, it is
also unsurprising that Robert Pickton took Sereena Abotsway, Mona Wilson, Andrea Joesbury, Brenda Wolfe, Georgina Papin, and Marnie Frey,
paid them for vaginal or oral intercourse, murdered them, dismembered
their bodies, and distributed and disposed of what was left of them at the
local meat shops and rendering plant where he sent the pigs he purchased
each week at auction.22 What Robert Pickton did to these women was the
material articulation of a social, political, and legal rendering that had already occurred—“a kind of bestialization of [wo]man achieved through the

18

World Health Organization, “Collective Violence” (Geneva: World Health Organization,
2002), online: World Health Organization <www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/
violence/world_report/factsheets/en/collectiveviolfacts.pdf>.

19

Missing Women’s Inquiry Vol I, supra note 1 at 110.

20

Cameron, On the Farm, supra note 9 at 695 (quoting Don Adam, Vancouver Police Department).

21

Missing Women’s Inquiry Vol II, supra note 12 at 1.

22

R v Pickton, 2009 BCCA 299 at paras 32, 35, 288 BCAC 246 (testimony of Lynn Ellingsen and Gina Houston discussing Pickton’s practice of attending auctions each Saturday). See also Larry Pynn, “Ottawa Rates Health Risk from Human Remains in
Farm Meat” Vancouver Sun (24 October 2004), online: <www.missingpeople.net/ottawa
_rates_health_risk_from_hu.htm>; “Human Remains from Pickton Farm May Have
Reached Food Supply”, The Globe and Mail (10 March 2004), online: <www.
theglobeandmail.com/news/national/human-remains-from-pickton-farm-may-havereached-food-supply/article1129161/>.
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most sophisticated political techniques.”23 This article examines what role
the criminal justice process plays in constituting or perpetuating the social relations that produce this bestialization.
While somewhat awkward, referring to the “Pickton circumstance”—
rather than to Pickton’s actions—is also intentional. It emphasizes the
importance of recognizing the social relations that produced this collective
violence—the way in which women from the Downtown Eastside were
abandoned through processes that deprived them of citizenship and humanity in order to maintain the hegemonic structures that produce citizenship and preserve humanity for some by abandoning others.
The remainder of the article is divided into four parts. Part II examines the representation of the murdered women in the judicial decisions
produced throughout the Pickton proceedings. The prosecution of Pickton,
because it produced seventy-six separate decisions, offers a unique opportunity to examine the anatomy of a case as articulated through judicial
rulings.24 Part II reveals that the criminal justice process as reported by
the courts did not recognize the humanity and citizenship of the murdered
women through the story it told about them. In fact, the judicial representation of the women murdered by Pickton perpetuates the same discursive construction of them that constitutes and reinforces the alienation of
this category of individuals in broader public and political contexts. Part
III briefly examines whether the Pickton trial and appeals produced a
truth account about what happened to these women. The article concludes
that this did not occur. Part IV questions whether the prosecution and
conviction of Pickton on six counts of second-degree murder achieved justice for the families of the women he murdered. Part IV also rejects the
possibility that the humanity and citizenship of the murdered women

23

Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, translated by Daniel
Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) at 3 [Agambern, Homo
Sacer] (quoting Michel Foucault).

24

Consider, for example, the very high profile prosecution of Paul Bernardo. It involved
less than a third as many reported decisions: R v Bernardo, [1995] OJ No 1374 (QL)
(Gen Div); R v Bernardo, [1995] OJ No 1394 (QL) (Gen Div); R v Bernardo, [1993] OJ
No 2047 (QL) (Gen Div); R v Bernardo, [1994] OJ No 4114 (QL) (Gen Div); R v Bernardo, [1994] OJ No 1718 (QL) (Gen Div); R v Bernardo, [1994] OJ No 4119 (QL) (Gen Div);
R v Bernardo, 50 CRR (2d) 332, 1994 CanLII 7405 (Ont Gen Div); R v Bernardo, [1995]
OJ No 4 (QL) (Gen Div); R v Bernardo, 38 CR (4th) 229, 26 WCB (2d) 343 (Ont Gen
Div); R v Bernardo (1995), 26 WCB (2d) 328, [1995] OJ No 247 (Ont Gen Div); R v Bernardo, [1995] OJ No 585 (QL) (Gen Div); R v Bernardo (1995), 42 CR (4th) 85, 28 WCB
(2d) 129 (Ont Gen Div); R v Bernardo, [1995] OJ No 1379 (QL) (Gen Div); R v Bernardo,
[1995] OJ No 2247 (QL) (Gen Div); R v Bernardo, [1995] OJ No 2248 (QL) (Gen Div); R
v Bernardo (1995), 42 CR (4th) 96, 28 WCB (2d) 130 (Ont Gen Div); R v Bernardo,
[1995] OJ No 3866 (QL) (Gen Div); R v Bernardo, [1995] OJ No 1472 (QL) (Gen Div); R
v Bernardo, [1995] OJ No 2988 (QL) (Gen Div).
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could be restored even if justice were achieved for the family members
who grieve them. One response to the claims that the Pickton proceedings
did not represent the humanity of the murdered women, produce
knowledge about what happened, or achieve justice for the families is that
none of these objectives form a legitimate part of the criminal justice process. Part V, the final part of the article, offers three reasons why it is important to identify what was not achieved by the Pickton proceedings regardless of one’s perspective on the functions and limits of the criminal
justice process. It concludes by suggesting that the outcomes of the Pickton prosecution both highlight the limitations of the criminal justice system and offer an analytical framework for examining other institutional
responses, such as the Missing Women’s Inquiry, to the kind of collective
violence that gave rise to the Pickton circumstance.
This article, examining the criminal justice response to the missing
and murdered women from the Downtown Eastside, forms the first article
of a two-part project. Drawing on the significant limitations of the criminal justice response identified in this article, the second article will examine the Missing Women’s Inquiry as an institutional response to legal
abandonment in the Downtown Eastside.

II. The Story of the Missing Women as Reported by the Courts
“Robert William Pickton became a person of interest to the police in
early 2001 when a task force began collecting the DNA of women missing
from the downtown eastside of Vancouver. All the missing women were
drug-dependent sex-trade workers who had frequently worked in that area.”25 These are the opening lines of the Supreme Court of Canada’s majority opinion dismissing Pickton’s appeal from conviction on six counts of
second-degree murder. This is Justice Charron’s sole descriptive reference
to the missing and murdered women.
Justice Charron’s description is quite fitting. It is not apt because of
its accuracy. In fact, some of the women missing from the Downtown
Eastside were not drug dependent, and not all of them were working in
the sex trade.26 Instead, it is fitting because it encapsulates almost entirely the totality of information about the humanity of these women that can
be gleaned from the seventy-five rulings that came before this decision
from the Supreme Court of Canada. The story of Robert William Pickton’s
trial, at least as told by its official texts, is not a story about the women he
murdered. It is Robert Pickton who became a person of interest. The miss25

R v Pickton, 2010 SCC 32 at para 1, [2010] 2 SCR 198.

26

Missing Women’s Inquiry Vol I, supra note 1 at 18. See generally Cameron, On the
Farm, supra note 9.
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ing women are largely missing from these seventy-six judicial renderings.27
The seventy-six rulings emanating from Pickton’s trial and appeals offer only three pieces of information about the murdered women: drugdependent, sex-trade workers who lived in the Downtown Eastside.28
These descriptors occur for the first time in an interlocutory ruling on the
admissibility of similar fact evidence related to the 1997 attack by Pickton
on Person X.29 There are six short paragraphs, devoted one each, to the six
women he stood accused of murdering.30 The structure of each paragraph
is the same and each opens with the same sentence:
“Ms. Abotsway was a drug dependent sex trade worker who lived and
worked in Vancouver, primarily the Downtown East Side.”31
“Ms. Wilson was a drug dependent sex trade worker who lived and
worked in Vancouver, primarily the Downtown East Side.”32

27

While the site of examination for this article is these seventy-six rulings, seventy-three
of which were authored by Justice Williams of the British Columbia Supreme Court,
this should not be taken as a critique of any individual judge. It is a critique of the criminal justice process, the judicial and legal culture that supports it, and the doctrinal and
procedural rules that undergird it. It is true that no one among Justice Williams, the
three-judge panel of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, nor the nine justices of the
Supreme Court of Canada authored these decisions in a manner that recognized the
humanity of these women. However, all of them operated within the same legal and
professional traditions, culture, and rules. Without changing these, it is hard to assume
any decision maker would have done differently.

28

There is one reference to the Aboriginality of most of the missing women by the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in R v Pickton, 2009 BCCA 300 at para 25, 260 CCC (3d)
132.

29

R v Pickton, 2006 BCSC 1447, [2006] BCJ No 3672. Person X, whose identity remained
anonymous throughout the proceedings, is the only woman known to have survived an
attack by Pickton. She testified at the preliminary inquiry regarding an incident in
which he picked her up from the Downtown Eastside, took her to his farm and attempted to kill her after they had engaged in sexual intercourse. Her testimony was excluded
at trial (ibid).

30

As discussed below in the section on justice for the families, Justice Williams granted a
motion by the defence to have the twenty-six counts of murder against Pickton severed
into two trials (R v Pickton, 2006 BCSC 1212, supra note 10 at para 39). The first (and,
in the end, only) trial involved six counts arising from the murders of Sereena Abotsway, Mona Wilson, Andrea Joesbury, Brenda Wolfe, Georgina Papin and Marnie Frey
(R v Pickton, 2006 BCSC 1447, supra note 29).

31

Ibid at para 3. One might respond immediately to these observations by suggesting that
both the structure and content of this judicial ruling makes sense given that this was a
decision regarding the admission of similar fact evidence. This point will be addressed
below.

32

Ibid at para 4.
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“Ms. Joesbury was a drug dependent sex trade worker who lived and
worked in Vancouver, primarily the Downtown East Side.”33
“Ms. Wolfe was a drug dependent sex trade worker who lived and
worked in Vancouver, primarily the Downtown East Side.”34
“Ms. Papin was a drug dependent sex trade worker who lived and
worked in Vancouver, primarily the Downtown East Side.”35
“Ms. Frey was a drug dependent sex trade worker who lived and
worked in Vancouver, primarily the Downtown East Side.”36
Following this one sentence description of each, the discussion shifts
to DNA, blood, gunshot wounds to the head, and post-mortem dismemberment. It does not shift back. In these seventy-six judicial texts the
drug-dependent sex-trade worker from the Downtown Eastside seamlessly and without pause becomes frozen partial remains, dismembered hands
and feet, the fragment of a jawbone with teeth still attached,37 and perhaps most revealingly “meat product”38—materially and symbolically indistinguishable from the other animals “butcher[ed]”39 on the Pickton
farm.40
Such a bestial representation of the women Pickton murdered evokes
concepts such as the bare life of Giorgio Agamben’s homo sacer and the
state of exception in which (s)he exists.41 Agamben asserts that modern

33

Ibid at para 5.

34

Ibid at para 6.

35

Ibid at para 7.

36

Ibid at para 8.

37

Ibid at paras 3–8.

38

R v Pickton, 2006 BCSC 1601 at para 37, [2006] BCJ No 3676.

39

R v Pickton, 2009 BCCA 300, supra note 28 at para 37.

40

The police found a number of plastic bags containing “ground meat” in freezers on the
Pickton farm. Samples of the “meat” yielded a combination of DNA from Cynthia Feliks
and Inga Hall. The samples also contained “protein characteristic of pig and human” (R
v Pickton, 2006 BCSC 1601, supra note 38 at para 10. It seems telling that the sample
would even be referred to as meat by the court. It is arguably more common to refer to
human flesh than to human meat. The noun meat is habitually used to refer to the flesh
of an animal as food, as material intended for consumption.

41

This insight belongs to Geraldine Pratt, who brings Agamben’s theory of legal abandonment to bear on the women murdered by Robert Pickton in “Abandoned Women and
Spaces of Exception” (2005) 37:5 Antipode 1052. According to Agamben, bare life is the
“definition of a life that may be killed without the commission of a homicide ... [but that]
could not be put to death following a death sentence” (Agamben, Homo Sacer, supra
note 23 at 165). The bare life of the homo sacer is a life with no political relevance (other
than its constitutive role in establishing the sovereign). It is a life that can be eliminat-
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liberal democracies are founded on a state of exception—a generalized
suspension of the law that he describes as the sovereign ban.42 By suspending the law, a border between inclusion and exclusion is created, and
entire categories of citizens are eliminated. They are legally abandoned.
Such people are, in his words, rendered bare life. By bare life Agamben
means the mere life of the body stripped of all the “customary forms or
qualifications of lives (bios) in a community.”43 Bare life is life reduced to
matter. According to Agamben, states of exception operate by animalizing
the human.44 In the judicial texts of the Pickton proceedings women are
“butcher[ed]”45 and human flesh is transformed into “meat product”.46
What is missing from the legal account of the missing women is as
significant to this animalistic rendering as is the story that the law does
tell about them. A disproportionate number of the women that Pickton
murdered were Aboriginal.47 Sherene Razack would argue that because of
the relationship between colonialism, racism, and prostitution even those
women who were not of Aboriginal descent were racialized. For Razack, to
be a woman working in prostitution in the Downtown Eastside is to be the
racial Other.48 However, race is invisible in the law’s story of Robert Pickton and the women he murdered. In seventy-five of the seventy-six judicial rulings produced over the course of the Pickton trial and appeals,
ed without punishment (ibid at 139, 165). Presumably, for Agamben, a death sentence
implies that one is still in some sense being treated as a citizen.
42

Ibid at 15–29. In this regard, Agamben draws upon Carl Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty: “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (Carl Schmitt, Political Theology:
Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2005) at 5).

43

Leland de la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2009) at 207.

44

Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, translated by Kevin Attell (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2004) at 34.

45

R v Pickton, 2009 BCCA 300, supra note 28 at para 37.

46

R v Pickton, 2006 BCSC 1601, supra note 38 at para 37.

47

Missing Women’s Inquiry Vol I, supra note 1 at 94.

48

According to Razack, the desire to transgress and the repugnance in response to transgression are central to the maintenance of class, race, and gender hegemonies. All three
hegemonic systems are deployed to stabilize a structure of dominance. In this way, social, legal, and political relations constitute the bodies and spaces of prostitution, and
the bodies and spaces of prostitution secure a white, middle class, elite (Sherene Razack, “Race, Space, and Prostitution: The Making of the Bourgeois Subject” (1998) 10:2
CJWL 338 at 341–43, 346 [Razack, “Race, Space, and Prostitution”]). This is why, for
Razack, the question is not who works as a prostitute but why other women do not work
as prostitutes: “Women in prostitution are integrally connected to women who are not
engaged in prostitution ... because the violence directed at some of us enables others to
live lives of lesser violence. Prostitution is thus always about racial, class, and male
dominance, and it is always violent” (ibid at 359–60).
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there is no reference to the Aboriginality of these women. It is impossible
to grasp the reality of the Pickton circumstance, let alone begin to formulate systemic responses to it, without recognizing that this collective violence was perpetuated against Aboriginal women in particular. Yet, in
hundreds of pages of judicial text there is only one reference, by Justice
Finch of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, to the fact that most of the
women Pickton murdered were of Aboriginal descent.49
Discussing this same failure to signify race in the media representation of women from the Downtown Eastside, Geraldine Pratt highlights
the long colonial history of assuming that Aboriginal peoples and cities
are mutually exclusive—a colonial geography that makes First Nations
women “almost naturally disappear” from the Downtown Eastside.50 Dara
Culhane refers to this as a form of “race blindness.”51 She describes it as a
regime of disappearance that selectively marginalizes Aboriginal women
in the Downtown Eastside by privileging representations of drug addiction and commercial sex “rather than the ordinary and mundane brutality
of everyday poverty” and its relationship to the ongoing effects of settler
colonialism.52 For Razack, this kind of “insistence on racelessness” makes
the law complicit in the perpetuation of violence against Aboriginal women.53
While the gender of those whose lives were taken by Pickton is communicated in these texts, the fact that all of them were women, and in
particular women living in a community where the male privilege of one
well known john was maintained by police and others in authority, also
does not figure in the legal analysis.54 The criminal justice response to the
Pickton circumstance does not tell a story of structuralized and systematized male violence against women.

49

R v Pickton, 2009 BCCA 300, supra note 28 (“[a]ll 26 victims on the original Indictment
were young women who were known to be engaged in the business of providing sexual
services for payment. They all practiced their trade in the DTES and lived in the vicinity. Most of the 26 victims were of Aboriginal descent. Most were addicted to illegal
drugs. Sex-trade workers of this description and from this location were known to be
very reluctant to work outside the DTES” at para 25).

50

Pratt, supra note 41 at 1062.

51

Dara Culhane, “Their Spirits Live Within Us: Aboriginal Women in Downtown
Eastside Vancouver Emerging Into Visibility” (2013) 27:3 American Indian Quarterly
593 at 595.

52

Ibid.
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Sherene Razack, “Gendered Racial Violence and Spatialized Justice: The Murder of
Pamela George” (2000) 15:2 Can JL & Soc 91 at 95.

54

See generally Cameron, On the Farm, supra note 9.
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Unlike with respect to the women themselves, the official texts of the
criminal justice process do tell a fuller story about both Robert Pickton
and the site where he murdered, dismembered, and disposed of these
women. Pickton, unlike the women he was on trial for murdering, is constructed as a whole person in the texts of these decisions. The articulation
of his life has temporality and three dimensions. A reader of these texts
learns about his relationship with his mother and his brother,55 his mental acuity,56 and his affinity for the property he owned with his siblings.57
Also apparent from these decisions is the way in which the procedural
and doctrinal rules of the criminal justice system preserved some dignity
for Robert Pickton throughout this process. For example, the defence was
successful in having a jailhouse video edited before trial to remove segments depicting Pickton alone in a cell masturbating.58 The Crown opposed the editing on the basis that the fact that Pickton was relaxed
enough to masturbate contradicted the defence’s assertion that Pickton
was so agitated and fatigued that any statements he made during this period were unreliable. Justice Williams excluded the evidence on the basis
that “the knowledge that Mr. Pickton was masturbating in his cell and
the image of him doing so are reasonably capable of diminishing his dignity in the eyes of the jurors, although in a fairly minor way.”59
The rulings also offer many details about the property where these
women were murdered. We learn that the land was used as a farm and
that its civic address was 953 Dominion Avenue, Port Coquitlam, British
Columbia.60 In addition to husbandry, the property was also used for a
topsoil and landfill business.61 It is evident from the judicial rulings that
on this property there were several buildings including a workshop, a
slaughterhouse, a trailer and an old farmhouse.62 Several decisions make

55

See e.g. R v Pickton, 2006 BCSC 995, [2006] BCJ No 3667 (regarding the admissibility
of Pickton’s statements to the police Justice Williams wrote: “I will proceed on the assumption that Mr. Pickton is close to and cares very deeply for his brother” at para
268).

56

Ibid (“Mr. Pickton is a simple man. ... That said, Mr. Pickton is by no means intellectually dysfunctional or unable to manage with ordinary, day to day interactions with other persons” at para 201).

57

Ibid (“I accept that Mr. Pickton was quite attached to his property and that it was very
important to him” at para 264).

58

R v Pickton, 2007 BCSC 29, supra note 7.

59

Ibid at para 12.

60

See e.g. R v Pickton, 2006 BCSC 995, supra note 55 at para 95.

61

Cameron, On the Farm, supra note 9 at 6.

62

See e.g. R v Pickton, 2009 BCCA 300, supra note 28 at paras 19–21.
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clear that it was a seventeen-acre property about thirty kilometres from
the Downtown Eastside, in Port Coquitlam, a suburb of Vancouver.63
What one cannot learn from these texts about the land where these
(mostly) Aboriginal women died, is that it originally belonged to the Coast
Salish peoples and that it was only in the latter part of the nineteenth
century that European settlers took this land from its original inhabitants
and began farming in the area.64 Similarly, the text of these decisions reveals that, according to the Crown, Pickton lured these women away from
the Downtown Eastside to this land in Port Coquitlam by offering them
additional money.65 However, what cannot be gleaned from the law’s story
of the Pickton circumstance is that Pickton had the funds available to do
this because he had subdivided and sold off significant chunks of this
land,66 which had been taken from the Coast Salish peoples by European
settlers, acquired by Pickton’s ancestors, and eventually inherited by
Pickton and his siblings.67 At the time of his incarceration Robert Pickton
was a wealthy man.68 Colonialism and its living legacy are as constitutive
of Pickton in both symbolic and material ways as they are of the women
he murdered.
Why was the Aboriginality of these women not part of the law’s story?
Similarly why do the reality and impact of colonialism not figure in the
texts of these decisions? It is not that these factors are irrelevant to the
factual circumstances and legal doctrine involved in the Pickton trial. For
example, the defence attempted to have the Crown’s forensic evidence relating to Wendy Crawford—a piece of bone recovered from a manure cistern on the Pickton property—excluded on the basis that it was not actually part of her remains.69 The defence argued unsuccessfully that the
bone was an Aboriginal artifact that had at some point been contaminated

63

See e.g. ibid at para 19; R v Pickton, 2006 BCSC 1212, supra note 10 at para 26.

64

Chuck Davis, Where Rails Meet Rivers: The Story of Port Coquitlam (Madeira Park, BC:
Harbour, 2000) at 24. The city of Vancouver, including the area that is now called the
Downtown Eastside, was also land that had been owned and occupied by the Coast Salish peoples for over 10,000 years (see Culhane, supra note 51 at 595).

65

R v Pickton, 2010 SCC 32, supra note 25 at para 15.
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Stevie Cameron, On the Farm, supra note 9 at 6.
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Ibid; Davis, supra note 64 at 24.
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In 2007, the Pickton farm was worth $7.1 million (Stevie Cameron, The Pickton File
(Toronto: Knopf, 2007) at 233–34).

69

R v Pickton, 2006 BCSC 1601, supra note 38 at para 21. Wendy Crawford was one of
the twenty other women that Pickton was charged with murdering. These twenty
charges were severed from the Pickton trial. The Crown introduced evidence of Wendy
Crawford’s remains as similar fact evidence intended to establish a distinctive modus
operandi on the part of Pickton (ibid at para 17).
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with Wendy Crawford’s DNA. They introduced expert evidence from a forensic anthropologist who testified that the bone resembled an Aboriginal
artifact used for probing or piercing and that approximately 140 such artifacts had been recovered from the Pickton farm.70 Presumably, the presence of so many Aboriginal artifacts on this seventeen-acre property reflects the colonial settlement of what was traditional Salish territory. The
displacement of Aboriginal peoples from this land that became the Pickton farm was a relevant fact regarding the strength of the defence argument with respect to this piece of evidence. Yet it was not part of the story.
The sentencing decision in Pickton provides another example. Justice
Williams ordered the strictest sentence legally possible—a life sentence,
as required under the law, with a twenty-five-year period of parole ineligibility.71 Length of parole ineligibility is to be determined based on the
circumstances of the offender and the offences, as well as the degree of
moral culpability.72 In identifying the relevant circumstances in this case,
Justice Williams described the women’s troubled lives and extreme vulnerability. The factors identified as contributing to this vulnerability were
addictions and involvement in survival sex work. There is no reference to
the fact that four of the six women he was convicted of murdering were
Aboriginal.73 Conditions of vulnerability are sourced in the individual actor rather than racism and the history of colonialism. Moreover, the racial
pattern of these murders is not identified as a circumstance relevant to
the seriousness of Pickton’s offences or the degree of moral culpability.
Consider a third example. The Crown sought to introduce several
pieces of similar fact evidence in the Pickton trial.74 Similar fact evidence
is factual evidence of other misconduct of an accused introduced for the
purpose of inferring that the accused committed the misconduct at issue
in the trial.75 It is only admissible in exceptional circumstances. In cases
such as this one, in which it is introduced by the Crown in an effort to establish the identity of the perpetrator, the analysis regarding its admissi-

70

Ibid.
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R v Pickton, 2007 BCSC 2039 at paras 20–21, [2007] BCJ No 3109.
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R v Shropshire, [1995] 4 SCR 227 at 242–43, 129 DLR (4th) 657.
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R v Pickton, 2006 BCSC 1212, supra note 10. Presumably, the assumption at that point
was that a second trial involving the twenty severed counts would proceed once the first
trial was completed. As discussed below, this second trial never occurred. After Pickton’s conviction on six counts of second-degree murder was upheld by the Supreme
Court of Canada, Attorney General Wally Oppal decided to stay the additional twenty
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Sidney N Lederman, Alan W Bryant & Michelle K Fuerst, The Law of Evidence in
Canada, 3rd ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 2009) at 676.
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bility focuses almost exclusively on the similarity in modus operandi and
evidence of signature type behavior.76 In performing this analysis the
court is required to conduct a two-step inquiry. The first step involves examining the similarity between the way in which the acts were committed
in order to assess how likely it is that the same person committed both
acts. The second step requires the court to determine whether there is
some evidence linking the accused to the similar act.77 The first step of
this inquiry would encourage the Crown in Pickton to articulate a narrow
and specific description or profile of the missing women in an effort to introduce the similar fact evidence of Pickton’s other murders. The profile
adopted was, of course, that of the drug-dependent sex-trade worker from
the Downtown Eastside. The phrase drug-dependent sex-trade worker
was embraced like a mantra for the Pickton trial in the media,78 and in
the judicial texts this phrase is repeated so frequently that it becomes a
slogan-like identity category—a vacuous shibboleth capturing precisely
the constitutive lack that signifies the creatures who inhabit Agamben’s
state of exception. It is true that the disciplining effect of the legal doctrine in this instance demands a descriptive account reduced to whatever
common denominator is available.
To be admissible, similar fact evidence must be sufficiently similar.79
Much of the Crown’s case turned on establishing a repeated pattern of
conduct involving the removal of women with a certain profile from a cer-
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R v Arp, [1998] 3 SCR 339 at 365–66, 166 DLR (4th) 296. Pickton was originally
charged with twenty-six murders. Ultimately, twenty of those counts were severed from
the trial. This left only the six counts for which the remains of the women were discovered on Pickton’s property, and the defence had conceded their deaths. Once the defence
motion to sever the counts and proceed with two trials was granted, the only way for
the Crown to introduce the evidence of the twenty other murders in the first trial for
the six counts was as similar fact evidence. The Crown was mostly unsuccessful in introducing evidence of the murder of these twenty other women. See e.g. R v Pickton,
2006 BCSC 1601, supra note 38; R v Pickton, 2006 BCSC 1447, supra note 29. With respect to the six counts that did proceed, the jury could only consider the evidence for
each one individually, unless the Crown was permitted to introduce them as cross-count
similar fact evidence with respect to the others. The Crown was successful in this regard. Convictions against Pickton on counts four to six turned on cross-count similar
fact evidence regarding counts one to three: “There was no forensic evidence or opinion
as to the cause of death of the victims in Counts 4 through 6. Proof of homicide in each
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299, supra note 22 at para 20).
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Eastside (Halifax: Fernwood, 2010) at 13–14. See generally Jennifer England, “Disciplining Subjectivity and Space: Representations, Film and its Material Effects” (2004)
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tain area of Vancouver. But four of the six women he was on trial for
murdering were Aboriginal, and a massively significant number of the
other women Pickton confessed to murdering (evidence of which the
Crown sought to admit as similar fact) were Aboriginal.80 If race was not
rendered invisible in the manner Razack suggests—if the social relations
that situated Aboriginal bodies in particular in a vulnerable positionality
vis-à-vis Pickton were recognized—the Aboriginality of these women
would be at least as cogent and important an aspect of the similar fact
analysis as was their relationship to drugs. Similarly, all of the women
Pickton murdered were living in poverty.81 Why was this shared socioeconomic status not a salient part of the similar fact profile?
The admissibility of similar fact evidence turns on the cogency of the
similarity. The cogency of the similarity is informed, if not dictated, by
culturally and socially biased assessments.82 In other words, how we
characterize, categorize and compare is informed by how we see the
world. Both the principles underpinning the law of evidence and the application of its doctrine mirror social, political, and cultural contexts.83 Indeed, the drug-dependent sex-trade worker from the Downtown Eastside
was the central and almost exclusive character in the media’s story—and
thus the public imagination—of these women long before jurists adopted
this same profile to satisfy the doctrinal demands of similar fact evidence
rules.84 This is not a coincidence.
Moreover, it is not that, absent the doctrinal demands of a similar fact
evidence analysis, the spectre is replaced by a more three dimensional,
human representation of the women who were murdered. “[D]rug dependent sex trade worker” is also used as the sole descriptor of these
women in contexts where there appears to be no doctrinal justification for

80

Missing Women’s Inquiry Vol I, supra note 1 at 94. See Hugill, supra note 78 at 46–47
(surveying estimates of the number of missing women who were Aboriginal—
somewhere between one third to over half).
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Hugill, supra note 78.
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its invocation.85 Indeed, the names of the six women Pickton was on trial
for murdering do not even appear in the overwhelming majority of the judicial texts.86 The Supreme Court of Canada, in its decision upholding
Pickton’s conviction, does not call any of the six women by name. It refers
to them only as drug-dependent sex-trade workers.87
Similarly, the names of seventeen of the other twenty women that
Pickton was charged with murdering, counts which were severed from the
first trial, do not appear in any of the seventy-six texts.88 The combination
of procedural and evidentiary doctrine with the state’s ultimate decision
to stay the charges for the murder of these seventeen women renders
them totally invisible in the criminal justice response to the Pickton circumstance.
Why does it matter what story these texts, and the evidentiary and
procedural rules that underpin them, tell? Seventy-six reported decisions
issued from the criminal prosecution of Robert Pickton. That there were
this many reported decisions in this trial would be remarkable even if
there had been conflicting points of law to resolve. It is even more remarkable given that this was not the case. Despite the volume of judicial
ink spilled on this case the precedential value of the Pickton proceedings
is almost negligible. Indeed, in total, these seventy-six separate decisions

85

See e.g. R v Pickton, 2006 BCSC 1881 at para 11, [2006] BCJ No 3681; R v Pickton,
2010 BCSC 1198, [2010] BCJ No 1669; R v Pickton, 2007 BCSC 42 at para 14, [2007]
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2, [2005] BCJ 3244; R v Pickton, 2007 BCSC 718 at para 1, [2007] BCJ No 3082. In so
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have been cited less than twenty times by subsequent courts.89 Neither
the Pickton proceedings as a whole, nor any one of the seventy-six decisions in particular, is destined to become part of the legal canon. But
these texts represent something more. Judicial writing has a public dimension.90 In one sense a reported decision is a public normative act.91
This is particularly true in the context of a case like Pickton in which decisions were presumably reported not for their precedential value but rather for the importance to the judiciary of ensuring public transparency in
such a high profile case.
There is little reason to assume that jurists could (or would) craft their
decisions with a precision that confines them solely to facts, concepts, and
descriptions that are legally relevant. This is true even setting aside the
important point that in many respects both the cognitive and procedural
processes used to identify which facts and descriptions are deemed legally
significant are socially determined.92 Judicial rulings are seldom cleansed
of every element that bears no specific weight on a legal determination.
89

R v Iyanam, 2013 ONSC 1091, 105 WCB (2d) 173; R v Spackman, 2012 ONCA 905, 295
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“[I]n legal writing, facts can be emphasized or omitted, made to appear
relevant when they are not, and skewed one way or another. The goals
are the same [as writing a good novel]—to tell a story by using words as
tools to produce a desired reaction.”93 Rules of procedure and evidence, the
strictures of doctrine, professional conventions and our social expectations
of law are presumed to limit, if not preclude, law’s storytelling capacity.
“Nevertheless narrative is ever present within the legal field. It has a way
of penetrating and manifesting itself clearly and forcibly, even after being
minimized, disguised or obscured by the legal course of action.”94 Every
written text is produced through a series of choices. These choices include
the decision to relate some facts and omit others, the selection of words
employed to convey a particular meaning, the choice of authorities drawn
upon, and the argumentative style adopted. The constellation of these
choices produces a narrative. More importantly, law’s stories in particular
are normative—they make a claim to truth.95 “Every judicial narrative is
a claim of knowledge. ... When judges narrate, our initial reaction is to
treat their narration as an accurate reflection of reality.”96
The figure of the drug-dependent sex-trade worker is a representation
of a mismanaged life. Under this schematic, poverty is understood as the
result of drug addiction rather than the cause.97 Involvement in streetlevel sex trade reveals individual failure to acquire sufficient education or
skills and poor decision making regarding the use of drugs. Under this
representation, the precarity of life in the Downtown Eastside becomes a
consequence of individual choice. In this sense, moral responsibility is
equated with rational action.98 Lack of opportunity, the effects of colonialism and gender discrimination, high unemployment, limited social assistance and the political and social choices that produced these circumstances are obscured. Correspondingly, governance models premised on
such neo-liberal concepts tend “to judge moral worth in terms of self-care
such that a ‘mismanaged life’ is itself evidence of and grounds for abandonment.”99
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An explanation for what happened that consistently involves a story of
the fallen young woman who set herself on the wrong path after getting
involved with drugs, choosing the wrong guy and deciding to prostitute
herself in order to support her addictions rationalizes the victimization of
these women as a function of poor decision making on the part of the individual. That this was the predominant media representation and social
understanding of the missing women is readily apparent in the coverage
and public response to their disappearances both before and after Pickton’s arrest.100 The almost universal reference in every media account to
their relationships to drug use, commodified sex, and little else, the invisibility of race and poverty in public and media discourse about the Pickton
circumstance, and the prolonged unwillingness on the part of police and
municipal politicians to respond to their disappearances are consistent
with this problematic neo-liberal account of the murdered women.101 The
judicial texts produced as a result of the Pickton proceedings maintained
this representation.
The voice of a judge, whether in the courtroom or in the text of a judicial ruling, represents the court and ultimately one arm of the state.102 Indeed, in the context of sexual violence, judicial rulings typically serve as
the only voice of the state in response to any individual violation. Women
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who exchange sex for money experience sexual violence at a rate that far
exceeds that of the general population.103 Responsiveness to the social, political, and legal infrastructure that so frequently relegates this category
of individuals to subhuman status demands displacing these hegemonies
rather than contributing to their discursive production through unidimensional constructs such as the drug-dependent sex-trade worker. In
part, this requires reflecting in the official texts of the criminal justice
process the humanity and citizenship of the women who bring these experiences to the criminal justice system. To date judicial texts have often
been unsuccessful in this regard.104
It is clear that the discursive contribution of the official texts of the
Pickton trial and the procedures and doctrine that undergird these texts
did not produce an account of the murdered women as fully human citizens. Instead, these official texts perpetuated an animalistic, subhuman
representation that obfuscates the social relations that produced the Pickton circumstance. Shifting from a textual analysis of the judicial rulings
in Pickton, the next two sections of this article will examine two aspects of
the outcome of the Pickton trial.

III. The Pickton Prosecution Did Not Produce a Truth Account
Pickton was convicted of murdering six women and sentenced to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. He
will likely spend the remainder of his life incarcerated, no longer able to
kill with impunity the legally abandoned women of the Downtown
Eastside. Does this mean that they have been returned from bare life—no
longer homines sacri—those that can be killed without punishment?105
Did Pickton’s trial, conviction, and sentencing—the state’s formal legal
process responding to the deaths of these women—restore their humanity? If one accepts that the murder of almost seventy women from the
Downtown Eastside of Vancouver was a function of collective violence
then it is difficult to conclude that the conviction and incarceration of
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Robert Pickton could posthumously reinstate citizenship to any of the
women he murdered. However, there are other potential outcomes of this
process that should be considered. One possibility includes the production
of truth.
The suggestion that the criminal justice process could yield truth or
produce knowledge about what happened to many of the women who went
missing from the Downtown Eastside during this time frame raises many
questions, among them the following two. First, does—or should—the
criminal justice process produce truth? Second, did this particular criminal justice process produce truth?
Whether the production of truth is an achievable or even a legitimate
aim of the criminal justice process is controversial. The law of evidence is
thoroughly imbued with tensions between the pursuit of truth and the
protection of societal values such as due process.106 In some cases, courts
have explicitly rejected the production of truth as the aim of the criminal
justice process.107 Yet, judicial rulings in Canada are redolent with rhetoric about the truth seeking function of the criminal trial.108 The Supreme
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Court of Canada has described it in these words: “The ultimate aim of any
trial, criminal or civil, must be to seek and to ascertain the truth. In a
criminal trial the search for truth is undertaken to determine whether the
accused before the court is, beyond a reasonable doubt, guilty of the crime
with which he is charged.”109 The search for truth is used by courts to justify both the inclusion and the exclusion of evidence; it is relied on both to
ensure and limit various procedural protections for the accused; and the
search for truth justifies both the requirement and denial of crown disclosure.110 While a conclusion on the proper relationship between truth and
the criminal justice process is beyond the scope of this discussion, its centrality to our understanding of the criminal trial is indisputable.
The answer to the second question—did this particular criminal justice process produce truth?—is more definitive. Whether one considers the
pursuit of truth to be a legitimate objective of the criminal justice process,
it is clear that the outcome of this particular trial did not produce a truth
account.111
Robert Pickton was charged with twenty-six counts of first-degree
murder. Twenty of those counts were severed from the original trial and
ultimately stayed. He was tried on six counts of first-degree murder and
convicted of six counts of second-degree murder. In other words, the jury
found Pickton not guilty of first-degree murder.112 To find an accused
guilty of either first- or second-degree murder the finder of fact (here the
jury) must conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused caused
the victim’s death.113 The difference between first and second-degree mur-
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der often relates to the element of planning and deliberation. Murder is
first-degree murder if it is planned and deliberate.114 Juries, of course, do
not give reasons for their decisions. The only knowledge that can be produced from a jury trial is that which can be deduced from the verdict itself. By acquitting Pickton of first-degree murder and convicting him of
second-degree murder, the jury in Pickton must be taken to have concluded that Pickton killed six women on six different occasions but that for
him none of these murders were planned and deliberate.115 This is a very
unusual, if not inexplicable, outcome. Was Pickton the world’s first unwitting serial killer?
Clearly neither the trial judge nor the British Columbia Court of Appeal believed that to be the case. In his sentencing decision Justice Williams commented: “This case is unique. It is unique because there are six
separate convictions from six separate events, taking place over a period
of approximately four years. ... The case is markedly different from virtually any other case to which I have been referred.” 116 Presumably in an effort to do what he could to mitigate the effect of the jury’s troubling verdict, Justice Williams took the relatively rare step of sentencing Pickton
to the maximum period of parole ineligibility—life without eligibility of
parole for twenty-five years. This is a sentence typically reserved for convictions of first-degree murder.
The Crown appealed Pickton’s acquittal on first-degree murder on the
basis that the trial judge erred in severing the other twenty counts of first
degree murder and by excluding relevant similar fact evidence. The
Crown argued that these rulings prevented it from demonstrating the
overwhelming evidence of planning and deliberation on the part of Pickton. In its decision to grant the Crown’s appeal, the British Columbia
Court of Appeal discussed excerpts from Pickton’s post arrest interview
with the police in which he referred to himself as “the head honcho” and
stated that he “had one more planned”.117 The court noted that “this is the
slimmest sampling of statements in the interview from which the re-
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spondent’s responsibility for the planned and deliberate murders of the
victims could be inferred.”118
Pickton was never retried on these six counts of first degree murder
nor was he tried on the other twenty counts. Robert Pickton was convicted
of six counts of murder on six different occasions without any planning
and deliberation. Despite the Crown’s success on appeal this result
stands. From a legal perspective, to find that the trial judge erred by excluding similar fact evidence of the other murders and severing twenty
other counts and that absent other considerations a new trial should be
ordered is not the same as finding Pickton guilty of first-degree murder.119
It is clear from Justice Donald’s dissenting opinion in the British Columbia Court of Appeal allowing the defence appeal and ordering a new
trial that he also considered the jury’s verdict implausible.120 “Despite the
body of evidence against Pickton, the jury deliberated over nine days and
reached the somewhat curious result of second degree murder.”121 For
Justice Donald, the jury’s verdict in Pickton brought to mind the following
passage from R. v. Cribbin: “There comes a point where a verdict cannot
be sustained if a jury is so misguided that there is a real possibility that
its verdict was the product of a compromise reached out of puzzlement or
frustration, albeit one that has an evidentiary foundation.”122 Perhaps
compromise is a plausible explanation for the jury’s puzzling verdict.
The possibility that the acquittals on all charges of first-degree murder were a function of compromise also raises the subject of jury nullifica-
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tion. Do juries convict on second-degree murder rather than first-degree
murder in cases where they consider the accused’s actions to be bad but
not that bad?123 Was this what happened in Pickton? Recall Razack’s observation that we care less about the bodies in degenerate spaces and often define out of existence the violence enacted on those bodies.124 Presented only with the spectre of the drug-dependent sex-trade worker from
the Downtown Eastside, was the humanity of these victims so unintelligible to the jury that they were unlikely to convict Pickton of Canada’s most
serious homicide?
In his discussion of high profile criminal trials in America, Lawrence
Friedman examines the notion of juries, compromise verdicts, and what
he calls the unwritten law.125 He argues that criminal trials are very often
“striking social documents. They sometimes shed a blinding light on social
norms that are otherwise shrouded in darkness and would otherwise be
almost impossible to document.”126 These social norms influence jury behaviour. To exemplify this phenomenon, Friedman points to the unwritten laws that have historically protected husbands who murder their
wives’ lovers and exonerated men accused of raping purportedly unchaste
women.127 Would the jury have acquitted Pickton of six counts of firstdegree murder if the victims had been white women with professional occupations and higher socioeconomic status? While the outcome of the
Pickton proceedings did not result in a truth account about what really
happened on that farm it may well have offered a lesson about the nature
of criminal justice and its relationship to the social norms that inform it.
Regardless of the reason for a compromise, a jury that arrives at a verdict
by finding a middle ground is neither functioning ideally nor, of course, is
it producing a truth account.
The unusual outcome of Pickton’s trial is also explainable if the jury
accepted the defence theory of the case. The defence presented Pickton as
an unsophisticated man of extremely low verbal intelligence.128 They
pointed to evidence that they argued implicated other individuals more
123
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extensively than Pickton was implicated. The defence theory was that another, or possibly more than one other, individual was responsible for the
murders.129 On the sixth day of deliberations the jury came back to the
trial judge seeking clarification as to whether they could convict Pickton if
they found that he had acted indirectly in the killing of one or more of the
women. Their question was about causation but it also reveals something
about their deliberations. The jury wanted to know whether they could
convict Pickton if they found that he had not acted alone. 130 It is possible
that the jury concluded that Pickton was involved in killing six women on
six different occasions but that this occurred without planning and deliberation on his part because someone else was the mastermind. They may
have accepted the defence suggestion that Pickton lacked the intelligence
necessary to have orchestrated these serial killings. Certainly if this is the
explanation for the outcome of this trial the process cannot be attributed
with having revealed any truth about what happened on that farm. No
one else was ever charged with these murders. More importantly, based
on the evidence and, as the sentencing decision, British Columbia Court of
Appeal decisions, and the Supreme Court of Canada decision suggest, this
conclusion seems implausible.131
Further demonstrating that the Pickton proceedings were not rooted
in a quest for the truth, on appeal the Crown changed its account of what
occurred on the Pickton farm. In its opening address at trial, the Crown
emphasized that Pickton acted alone: “[t]he Crown intends to prove that
these murders of these six women were the work of one man, the accused
Robert William Pickton.”132 For obvious strategic reasons given the jury’s
verdict and one of the defence’s arguments on appeal,133 in responding to
129
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the defence appeal before the Supreme Court of Canada, the Crown asserted that there was “considerable and obvious” evidence that Pickton
was the person in charge of a “murderous joint venture”.134 On appeal the
Crown argued that “the pool of evidence clearly left open the possibility
that others were acting in concert with Pickton.”135
For the purposes of this discussion, it does not matter whether the
verdict was a function of compromise, or of the erroneous exclusion of similar fact evidence that would have established the element of planning
and deliberation, or whether it occurred because the jury concluded that
the mastermind is still out there. Under any of these potential explanations it is not possible to draw from the outcome of the Pickton trial much
truth or knowledge about what really happened. Again, it may be that despite judicial rhetoric to the contrary no one really believes a criminal trial is or should be a truth seeking process. However assuming, as the Supreme Court of Canada has suggested,136 that criminal justice and truth
are imbricated in some fundamental respect, their union and the restoration of humanity in the face of collective violence that this union is
thought to achieve are not revealed in the outcome of the Pickton proceedings.

IV. Did the Pickton Trial Achieve Justice for the Families?
In responding to criminalized violence, courts and political actors often
further a narrative that involves pursuing justice for the victims and the
families of the victims.137 Broadly speaking there are two respects in
which one might consider the criminal justice process to have achieved
justice for the families of a murder victim. First, one might assert that the
trial process itself, by offering the families their “day in court”, ensures
justice for them. Second, the mere fact of conviction might be thought to
achieve this result.
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At one time, victims of crime were important players in the criminal
justice system.138 However, private prosecution and citizen action were
gradually replaced by public prosecution, a professional police force, and
state administered remedies.139 Then, in the latter part of the twentieth
century a renewed interest in victims of crime emerged in the form of victims’ rights discourse, the restorative justice movement, and the concept
of therapeutic jurisprudence.140 This led to government policies and rules
of criminal procedure aimed at creating some opportunity for victims of
crime to become involved in the criminal justice process through victim
impact statements, victim compensation programs, and travel funding for
victims to attend court proceedings.141 All three of these were made available to some family members of some of the murdered women for some of
the Pickton proceedings.
The government provided funding for immediate family members to
attend the Pickton trial.142 According to Stevie Cameron, who interviewed
several family members, many of them experienced this process as deeply
problematic. They expressed grievances about the lack of information
they were given about the trial, about the very modest travel funds made
available to them, and about the government’s policy of designating only
two approved family members for each victim.143 Family members of the
six women Pickton was convicted of murdering were also given the oppor138
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tunity to speak at his sentencing hearing about the impact of these deaths
on them.144 According to Cameron, each family was given approximately
five minutes to read a statement describing their loss and its impact.145
Whether Pickton’s trial provided an adequate ability to participate for
some of the families such that they can be said to have had their day in
court is unclear. It is clear, however, that by the time the case reached the
appellate level the state did not recognize a role for the families of the
women Pickton murdered. In a letter advising the families of the six
women that the government would not provide travel funding for them to
attend the hearing, nor would it provide them with updates during the
nine day appeal, British Columbia’s Attorney General informed them that
the appeal was largely a technical exercise in which lawyers would submit
arguments alleging potential legal errors by the trial judge.146
In terms of the mere fact of conviction, it would be difficult and problematic to make conclusive claims regarding how the families of the six
women Pickton stood trial for murdering experienced his conviction. Some
family members expressed relief or a sense of closure in response to Pickton’s conviction on six counts of second degree murder.147 For others, his
acquittal on six counts of first-degree murder served as yet another example of the way in which the women he murdered were not recognized as
full citizens.148 Some Aboriginal community leaders also expressed significant dismay regarding Pickton’s acquittals.149
What is clear is that, based on their statements to the media, many
family members of the twenty women Pickton was charged with but never
tried for murdering, did not experience the six convictions as having ob-
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tained justice for the family members they lost.150 One year after Pickton’s
conviction on the first six counts of murder, Grand Chief Doug Kelly, a
member of the First Nations Leadership Council, urged the government
to proceed with the remaining charges. “There has been no closure for
many of the other victim’s families. The Crown must plan to proceed with
a second trial for Robert Pickton on all outstanding counts in order to give
the remaining victims’ families their day in court.”151 Lori-Ann Ellis,
whose sister Carrie Ellis was among the twenty other women Pickton was
charged with but not tried for murdering, made the following comments
in response to the decision to stay the outstanding charges against Pickton: “Six of the 26 were given justice, they were given their day in court ...
The families had an opportunity to speak in public ... on how it affected
them. That’s something this family will never have.”152 In discussing the
decision to stay charges against Pickton for the murder of Cynthia Feliks,
her stepmother commented that “[f]or a lot of us, there have only been six
girls that have actually had justice done for them ... We haven’t had justice for our girls.”153 The family of Dianne Rock wrote to numerous politicians, including the prime minister, asking that Pickton’s second trial
proceed. They wanted “Dianne’s story told so she is not forgotten as count
No. 4 on an indictment, filed away in a dusty legal folder never to be
opened again.”154
There were justifications for the British Columbia government’s decision not to prosecute Pickton on these twenty other counts given that he
was sentenced to life without parole for twenty-five years after his first
trial. It may be true, as then Attorney General Wally Oppal suggested,
that it would not be in the public interest to have a second lengthy and
complicated trial given the six convictions and life sentence.155 Presumably the economic and human cost of a second trial would be just as high as
the cost of the first proceeding. However, whether this is accurate does
not diminish the fact that many of the families experienced this decision
as a denial of justice. The focus of this discussion is on whether the crimi150
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nal justice response to the Pickton circumstance can be said to have attained justice for the families of his victims. With respect to the families of
the women whose murders were not prosecuted—women whose names
did not even appear in the judicial texts emanating from the Pickton
prosecution—it is difficult to conclude that this was achieved.156
Even if Pickton had been convicted of every one of the murders for
which he was originally charged, and even if all of the families of the
women Pickton murdered had experienced his conviction as a performance of justice, or had been given a participatory opportunity in the process, there is a sense in which this would not have recognized the citizenship and humanity of the murdered women. While representing these
women through the grief of their family members does gesture toward
recognition of their humanity it does not displace the social, political and
legal conceptions that reduced them to something less than human.
An obvious demonstration of this claim is provided by the sentencing
decision in Pickton.157 The decision references in a compelling way the
grief of family members “whose lives have been altered and forever
changed by these murders.”158 In describing the murders, the court
properly characterizes “[w]hat happened to them [as] senseless and despicable.”159 But this same court captures the “them” in this sentence with
only the following descriptors: “women who had troubled lives”; “persons
who were in the ugly grasp of substance abuse and addiction”; and “persons who were selling their bodies to strangers in order to survive.”160
Even if the Pickton trial did return some small number of these women to their families, it returned them in metaphorical body bags sewn
with the very norms and alienating discourse that rendered them bare in
the first place. Moreover, as Geraldine Pratt observes:
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Empathy through normalised family loss humanizes the murdered
women by locating them within narratives of the middle-class family. Not only is this a gendered and heteronormative narrative, it privatizes, individualizes, and potentially depoliticizes aboriginal women’s and sex workers’ specific marginality in the Downtown
Eastside.161

The specificity of these lives should not be obscured but rather situated in a fully contextualized and politically textured narrative. Sereena
Abotsway took part in annual community marches for the missing women
in the Downtown Eastside. She was physically and sexually abused as a
child.162 Brenda Wolfe, a member of the Kahkewistahaw First Nation, did
sex work to supplement a welfare income that was insufficient to support
her children. She was well known in the Downtown Eastside as someone
that people could turn to for support.163 Like Brenda Wolfe and many others, Patricia Johnson also struggled to make ends meet living on welfare.164 Dawn Crey, a frequent visitor to the Downtown Eastside Women’s
Centre was a member of the Sto:lo First Nation. Her parents were residential school survivors.165 Both Mona Wilson and Georgina Papin were
Aboriginal women who grew up in foster care environments and were
abused at young ages. Serena Abotsway, Andrea Borhaven, Dawn Crey,
and Helen Hallmark were also placed in foster care as children.166 Tiffany
Drew was an active member of the WISH Drop-In Centre in the Downtown Eastside. She and a good friend had developed a check-in safety system. Within hours of disappearing her absence was noticed.167 In journals
she kept throughout her life, Sarah de Vries described the overt racism
she experienced as a woman of colour in a white community.168 Angela
Jardine was last seen attending a community event in the Downtown
Eastside called “Out of Harm’s Way”.169
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To restore them to their full humanity these women need to be legible
as citizens in their own right. “[I]t is too easy to empathize in a generalized way as mothers (or sisters or fathers or brothers) if it allows us to
evade the specificity of sex workers’ lives and their particular (state regulated) vulnerability to violence.”170 Their humanity as women involved in
the sex trade, as Aboriginal women living in poverty, as colonial subjects
in a failed social welfare state, and as citizens that belonged to an active
and engaged community in the Downtown Eastside must be recognized. It
is not enough to grieve these women because they were someone’s daughter or mother. The notion of “getting justice for the families” taps into a
social script for which sympathy may be garnered without attributing responsibility. Drawing on Judith Butler’s concept of mourning, Geraldine
Pratt suggests that to actually grieve the missing women requires a willingness to undergo a transformation through recognition of our relationship to them. She suggests that this change might be achieved by witnessing what they experienced long before their deaths: “the chilling process of
abandonment within the everyday spaces of our cities, and a normalized
passing across the threshold into bare life.”171 Getting justice for the families may be a good in and of itself but it would not have reinstated the citizenship of this category of individuals. Moreover, as Rakhi Ruparelia has
argued, the narrow definition of those “victims” recognized by the criminal
law as worthy of participatory rights, such as the provision of a Victim
Impact Statement, focuses attention on the individual deviant offender
rather than the race, gender, and socioeconomic hierarchies that incriminate the state and society itself.172
In adjudicating the defence application to sever the twenty-six counts
of first-degree murder into two trials, Justice Williams identified the parties that have an interest in ensuring that “justice will be done” as “Mr.
Pickton, the Crown and the community.”173 In a criminal trial, the collective interest in seeing justice done is framed as a charge against the individual accused. The rights of the community are recognized, the loss to
the victims’ families might be acknowledged, and the responsibility of the
individual perpetrator is accepted. However, the capacity of the criminal
170
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justice process to register its own community’s responsibility for a circumstance of collective violence—to recognize our relationship to our victims—seems non-existent.

V. Conclusions on the Limits of the Criminal Justice Response
One response to the claims advanced above is that it is not the function of the criminal trial process, nor the texts it yields, to displace these
discursive exclusions, pursue knowledge or respond to the social relations
that produce violence against particular categories of people. This may be
true. It may be that the criminal justice process is constituted such that
its gaze is always and inevitably only on the individual accused. If this is
the case it makes the observations described above obvious and perhaps
self-explanatory. It does not, however, make them any less significant.
They are significant for at least three reasons.
First, it is always important to recognize the relationship between a
legal process, such as the criminal justice system, and its constitutive role
in the social context in which it operates. The women murdered by Pickton were legally abandoned—rendered to the mere life of bodies, material
substance necessary to the constitution of power hierarchies, yet denied
all of the qualifications and attributes of the lives of citizens.174 Pickton
alone did not do this. Pickton materialized an expulsion already actualized by colonialism, neo-liberalism, racism, sexism and the political, social, and legal infrastructures that support these social relations. That is
to say, the process of legal abandonment imposed upon these women, the
forty-three other women Pickton confessed to murdering,175 and the countless other women disposed of during the same time period,176 occurred
long before the Vancouver Police Department ignored reports that the
disappeared kept disappearing. Moreover, it continued well after the gavel dropped opening the first day of the Pickton trial in the newly anointed
New Westminster courtroom. The criminal justice process forms a part of
the social and legal context that perpetuates the racial and gendered specificity of violence in Canada. Criminal law as pedagogy teaches us who
matters, and even more often, who does not matter.
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Second, these observations about the Pickton proceedings are noteworthy because they exemplify limits of the criminal justice process that are
frequently ignored by policy-makers and politicians. There are implications to accepting that it is not the function of the criminal justice system
to recognize or restore the humanity of women such as those abandoned
to (and in) the Downtown Eastside.177 There is a significant disjuncture
between this articulation of its limited function and a popular narrative
about the criminal justice system’s virtuous protection of and vindication
for the victims of crime. The criminal justice system response to the Pickton circumstance, including the deeply problematic police response to the
missing women, the seventy-six judicial renderings that issued from Pickton’s criminal proceedings, and the ultimate outcome of these proceedings
did not offer an account of the murdered women and their lives that recognized their humanity, did not produce knowledge about what happened,
did not offer closure for most of the families of the women murdered by
Pickton, and did not restore the citizenship of these women.
Admittedly, it may be that “to say that you can solve the problem of ...
violence through the criminal justice system would be like saying that you
can solve health problems through the exclusive use of hospital emergency departments.”178 If this is true, then it is time to take seriously the need
to decentre the criminal justice system as the primordial institutional
mechanism for addressing violence against women. In other words, either
we accept that the current criminal justice model requires radical renovation if it is to recognize and respond to the social indicators of crime and
vulnerability, or we accept that criminal justice is a basement not a ceiling—a decontextualized, reactive, and individualized process that contributes to, rather than disrupts, the race-, sex-, and socioeconomic-based
social relations that empower some by abandoning others. Yet, as obvious
an observation as this may be, the state continues to maintain this disjuncture.
In its 2010 budget, the Federal Government introduced seven initiatives intended to address the issue of missing and murdered Aboriginal
women in Canada. The commitment involved millions of dollars to improve police services, including an enhanced Canadian Police Information
177
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Centre, a National Police Support Centre for Missing Persons, a missing
persons website and amendments to the Criminal Code provisions on
wiretapping.179 This 2010 initiative, which the government continued to
point to in 2013 as its response to the issue of disproportionate numbers of
missing and murdered Aboriginal women in Canada,180 is primarily about
increasing policing resources. In contrast to the millions of dollars dedicated to strengthening policing capacity, the 2010 initiative committed only $1 million over three years to reduce the vulnerability of young Aboriginal women to violence. As a second point of comparison, the government
of British Columbia spent over $102 million on the investigation and
prosecution of Robert Pickton.181 If it is not the function of the criminal
justice system to prevent and restore, but rather merely to respond to infractions of what we have identified through the criminal law as baseline,
bare minimum standards for human behavior, then the response to an
ongoing circumstance of collective violence should not be rooted in improved criminal law enforcement. Acknowledging the extremely limited
capacity of the criminal justice system to respond to circumstances of collective violence must also mean prioritizing other institutional responses
to fulfill functions that cannot be addressed through the criminal justice
system. To begin with, this means dedicating significantly more than $1
million to improve the social and economic circumstances of Aboriginal
women in Canada. In addition to prospective strategies aimed at preventing further abandonment by addressing the social relations that maintain
these forms of collective violence—a separate topic of enormous weight—
this means turning to retrospective institutional processes other than the
criminal justice response to pursue the kind of transformation that Pratt
describes: a grieving that is rooted in recognition of our relationship to collective violence and the bare life it produces.182
This brings us to the third reason why it is worthwhile to examine
what was not achieved by the Pickton prosecution. Identifying the interests not met by the criminal justice process can serve as an analytical
framework for evaluating the impact and efficacy of other state responses
to institutional and social failings such as this one. Accepting that the crimi179
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nal justice system did not—and perhaps was not intended to—return the murdered
women from bare life, it becomes important to ask whether the state has offered an
institutional response to the Pickton circumstance that recognizes the social relations,
displaces the problematic narratives, and challenges the social processes
that produced a state of exception in the Downtown Eastside? The institutional response that comes to mind, of course, is the commission of inquiry: in this case, the government of British Columbia’s Missing Women
Commission of Inquiry.
Public inquiries or commissions into police conduct, state-sponsored or
state-perpetuated sexual and physical abuse, and other institutional failures have become commonplace in Canada.183 Arguably, apart from the
criminal justice system public inquiry processes are the most significant,
expensive, and high profile government response to race, sexuality, and
gender-based harms in Canadian society.184 Unlike with the criminal justice system, they often involve a mandate that is explicitly systemic in its
orientation.185 Often, as was the case following the Pickton prosecution,
the impetus for these commissions originates from individual and public
expressions of dissatisfaction with the formal legal response to a societal
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or institutional failing.186 In other words, they are often preceded by criminal proceedings.187 Moreover, they are as long if not longer, and as expensive if not more expensive, than the criminal trials that precede them.188
The Missing Women’s Commission of Inquiry is thought to have cost the
government of British Columbia over $10 million.189 In a loose sense,
there can be overlap between these two processes. Sometimes, the same
government (and sometimes even the same individual) is responsible for
both the criminal justice response to and public inquiry into the same situation. This is particularly well exemplified by one individual’s multicapacity involvement in the Pickton circumstance.
Wally Oppal appears for the first time in the very first reported decision in the Pickton criminal proceedings.190 The decision concerned a pretrial application to have the court room closed for the preliminary inquiry.
In rejecting the application, the British Columbia Provincial Court relied
extensively on then Justice Oppal’s jurisprudence in a previous case.191 By
the time of Pickton’s trial, Mr. Oppal had been elected to the legislative
assembly of British Columbia and appointed as the province’s Attorney
General. As Attorney General, he oversaw the trial and was responsible
for the decision to stay the twenty additional charges against Pickton after Pickton’s second-degree murder convictions. Following his nearly five-
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year tenure as Attorney General, he went on to serve as the Commissioner of the Missing Women’s Inquiry and to author of its final report: Forsaken.192 In either a dramatic coincidence or a startling indication of how
thinly constituted the upper echelons of power and decision making are in
a particular community, the voice of Wallace Oppal served as both the
opening and closing acts in the state’s institutional response to the Pickton circumstance.
The point, for the purposes of this discussion, is that the same government purse and the same cohort of political and legal decision makers
established and administered both of these processes. In light of this, it
seems reasonable to ask whether the Missing Women’s Inquiry served
any of the functions found to be lacking in the criminal justice response.
The third reason it is important to observe what was not achieved by the
Pickton prosecution is that identifying its limits provides parameters by
which to evaluate the state’s other institutional response to the Pickton
circumstance.
Presumably, the Missing Women’s Inquiry represents the final institutional or state sponsored process in response to the Pickton circumstance.193 As noted in Part I, this article examining the criminal justice response to the missing and murdered women from the Downtown Eastside
forms the first part of a two-article project. Drawing on the significant
limits of the criminal justice response identified in this article, the second
article will address the following questions: Under the Missing Women’s
Commission of Inquiry, does the drug-dependent sex-trade worker from
the Downtown Eastside become a person of interest? Did the Missing
Women’s Inquiry produce a truth account capable of providing knowledge
or restoring humanity to the murdered women? Did the family members
of the murdered women experience the inquiry process as a performance
of justice, and more importantly, will the Commission and its report offer
192
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a transformative opportunity to realize the collective nature of the violence perpetuated against the murdered women?

